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|Battle of Old Baldy|
|Part of the Korean War|
Map of the Old Baldy area
|Commanders and leaders|
Paul Wilkins Kendall
|38,000||20,000|
|Casualties and losses|
The Battle of Old Baldy refers to a series of five engagements for Hill 266 in west-central Korea. They occurred over a period of 10 months in 1952–1953, though there was also vicious fighting both before and after these engagements.
In early June 1952, Major General David L. Ruffner of the 45th Division holding the right flank of the I Corps' line, was frustrated by the view that enemy observers had of his division's positions. Opposing the 45th Division from east to west were elements of the Chinese 338th and 339th Regiments (113th Division, 38th Army), the 350th and 349th Regiments (117th Division, 39th Army), and the 344th Regiment (115th Division, 39th Army). The other infantry components of the 113th, 115th, and 117th Divisions were in reserve, as was the 116th Division, 39th Army. The Chinese had over ten battalions of artillery positioned along the front in direct or general support roles. Maj. Gen. Ruffner laid plans for Operation Counter, a two-phase operation to capture and hold 12 outposts a few thousand yards in front of the main line. One of the most prominent hills came to be called "Old Baldy", which earned its nickname after artillery and mortar fire destroyed the trees on its crest. But as the highest point on a prominent east-west ridge, Old Baldy held strategic importance because it dominated terrain in three directions.
Several air strikes on known enemy strongpoints close to the outpost objectives took place during the daylight hours of June 6, 1952. Then, after dark, various units ranging from a squad to almost a company, advanced to take possession of the outposts. Evidently the Chinese had not anticipated the operation, because the attack units encountered little opposition except at Outpost 10 on Hill 255 and Outpost 11 on Hill 266. The former, which was to become better known as Porkchop Hill, was taken by two platoons from I Company, 180th Infantry Regiment, after a 55-minute fire fight with two Chinese platoons. On Old Baldy, two squads from A Company, 180th Infantry, exchanged small arms and automatic weapons fire with two Chinese squads, then withdrew and directed artillery fire upon the Chinese.
Private First Class James Ortega, a forward observer for the 171st Field Artillery Battalion, jumped into a trench and directed the artillery concentration which pounded the top of the hill with 500 rounds. When the artillery ceased, the men from A Company again probed the enemy's positions. Meeting intense fire, MSG John O. White took a squad, reinforced by a BAR and machine gun, and made a sweep to the rear of the enemy where they advanced to within 25-foot (7.6 m) of the Chinese before attacking. As the Chinese resistance crumbled, the infantrymen from A Company pushed their way toward the crest of Old Baldy, where Chinese artillery immediately began to come in. Despite the Chinese fire, the A Company squads hung on and took possession of Old Baldy shortly after midnight.
Once the outposts were seized, the task of organizing them defensively got under way. Aided by Korean Service Corps personnel the men of the 279th and 180th Infantry Regiments brought in construction and fortification materials and worked through the night. They built bunkers with overhead protection so that their own artillery could use proximity fuze shells when an enemy attack drew close to the outpost. They ringed the outposts with barbed wire and placed mines along the avenues of approach which were also covered by automatic weapons. Whenever possible, they sited their machine guns and recoilless rifles in positions where they could provide support to adjacent outposts. Signal personnel set up communications to the rear and laterally to other outposts by radio and wire and porters brought in stockpiles of ammunition. Back on the main line of resistance, infantry, tank, and artillery support weapons had drawn up fire plans to furnish the outposts with protective fires and a prebriefed reinforcing element was prepared to go to the immediate assistance of each outpost in the event of enemy attack. By morning the new 24-hour outposts were ready to withstand counterattacks, and garrison forces of 18 to 44 men were left behind as the bulk of the forces from the 279th and 180th Infantry Regiments withdrew to the main line of resistance.
The contest for Old Baldy became very heated on June 26, 1952. Almost 1,000-foot (300 m) west of the crest the Chinese had established positions that posed a constant threat to the 45th Division outpost and the 179th Infantry Regiment's troops in the area. Colonel Sandlin decided to destroy the Chinese positions. Early in the morning the 179th Infantry vacated its outpost on Old Baldy to permit air strikes and artillery and mortar barrages to be placed on the Chinese positions. Eight fighter-bombers from the Fifth Air Force dropped bombs and strafed the positions with rocket and machine gun fire; then the 45th Division artillery and mortar units began to bombard the Chinese positions.
C Company (Reinforced), 179th Infantry, under 1st Lt. John B. Blount, and F Company, 180th Infantry, commanded by Captain Tiller, which was attached to the 179th, attacked after the artillery and mortar fire. With C Company moving in from the left and F Company, supported by a tank, coming in from the right finger of Old Baldy, the assault forces soon ran into heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the two Chinese companies who comprised the defense force. After an hour of fighting the Chinese suddenly pulled back and directed artillery and mortar fire upon the attacking units. When the fire ceased, the Chinese quickly came back and closed with the men of C and F Companies in the trenches. A Company, 179th Infantry, under 1st Lt. George L. Vaughn, came up to reinforce the attack during the afternoon, for the Chinese machine guns were making it difficult for men of C and F Companies to move over the crest of the hill. The attack force regrouped, with F Company taking over the holding of the left and right fingers of Old Baldy, C Company holding the old Outpost 11 position, and A Company working its way around the right flank of the enemy defenders. For two hours the battle continued as the Chinese used hand grenades and machine guns to repel each attempt to drive them from their positions. Late in the day two tanks lumbered up the hill to help reduce the Chinese strongpoints; one turned over and the second threw a track, but they managed to inflict some damage before they were put out of action. Gradually the Chinese evacuated their positions, and the 179th was able to send engineers and several more tanks up to the crest.
During the night of June 26 and the following day, the three companies dug in to consolidate their defense positions on Old Baldy. On the afternoon of June 27 L Company, 179th Infantry, under 1st Lt. William T. Moroney, took over defense of the crest and F Company, 180th Infantry, moved back to a supporting position. C Company and elements of A Company held the ground northwest of the crest.
When night fell, Chinese activity around Old Baldy increased. Mortar and artillery fire began to come in on the 179th Infantry Regiment's positions and Chinese flares warned that the Chinese were on the move. At 22:00, the Chinese struck the defenders of L Company from the northeast and southwest. An estimated reinforced battalion pressed on toward the crest until it met a circle of defensive fire. From the main line of resistance, artillery, mortar, tank, and infantry weapons covered Chinese avenues of approach. L Company added its small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades to the circle which kept the Chinese at bay. Unable to penetrate the ring, the Chinese withdrew and regrouped at midnight.
The second and third attacks followed the same pattern. Each lasted over an hour during the early morning of June 28, and each time the Chinese failed to break through the wall of defensive fires. After suffering casualties estimated at between 250 and 325 men, the Chinese broke off the fight. The 179th Infantry reported six men killed and sixty-one wounded during the three engagements.
Late in the evening of June 28, the Chinese artillery and mortar fire on Old Baldy signaled the approach of another attack. Four Chinese squads reconnoitered the 179th positions at 22:00, exchanging automatic weapons and small arms fire. About an hour later the main assault began with a force estimated at two reinforced battalions moving in from the northeast and northwest behind a very heavy artillery and mortar barrage. This time the Chinese penetrated the perimeter and hand-to hand fighting broke out. Shortly after midnight a United Nations Command (UNC) flare plane began to illuminate the battle area and the defensive fires from the main line of resistance, coupled with the steady stream of small arms and automatic weapons fire from the three companies of the 179th on the hill, became more effective. By 01:00 on June 29, the Chinese disengaged to the north, having suffered losses estimated at close to 700 men. In return the Chinese had fired over 4,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire and the 179th Infantry had suffered 43 casualties, including 8 killed in action.
As June ended, the 45th Division, despite the lack of combat experience of many of its troops, had acquitted itself well on the battlefield. In the fight for the outposts the division had withstood more than twenty Chinese counterattacks and inflicted an estimated 3,500 casualties on the Chinese. It had also won a commendation from Eighth Army commander General James Van Fleet. The Chinese made one more attempt to wrest control of Old Baldy from the 45th Division's possession on the night of July 3. Three separate attacks, the last in battalion strength, met the same fate as their predecessors as the concentration of defensive firepower first blunted and then forced the Chinese to desist in their assaults. Much of the information included below are extracts taken from a book entitled "Movin On, the 279th Infantry Regiment 1950-54"
In late June 1952, the 45th Infantry Division was deployed on the MLR (Main-Line of Resistance) in the area along LINE JAMESTOWN and just south of the line of 12 outposts which were wrested from the Chinese and established by the three regiments of the 45th during the Apr-Jun 1952 time period. These 12 outposts were all north of the MLR and were generally manned by a platoon on a rotating basis.
Included in these 12 outposts were:
Outpost 08 (Eerie, Hill 191) Outpost 10 (Pork Chop Hill 234) Outpost 11 (Old Baldy Hill 266) Outpost 12 (Pokkae Ridge) In late June, along the MLR, Line JAMESTOWN, the 279th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) occupied the right flank sector of the division and the 179th RCT the left flank sector, the sector in which Old Baldy was located. The 180th RCT was in Corps reserve.
At 2100 hours on 1 July 52, the 180th RCT assumed operational control of the right flank of the division sector and the 279th RCT moved into reserve. The relief had been planned for the hours of darkness but rainy and foggy conditions delayed the operation until daylight of the 2nd of July.
NOTES ON THE COMPOSITION OF AN INFANTRY REGIMENT (1952):
An Infantry Regiment generally contained:
3 Infantry Battalions (1st, 2nd, 3rd) 1 Tank Company 1 Medical Company 1 Headquarters Company 1 Service Company 1 Heavy Mortar Company NOTES ON THE COMPOSITION OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION (1952):
1st Battalions included:
3 rifle companies (A,B,C) 1 weapons company (D) 1 Headquarters Company 2nd Battalions included: 3 rifle companies (E,F,G) 1 weapons company (H) 1 Headquarters Company 3rd Battalions included: 3 rifle companies (I,K,L) 1 weapons company (M) 1 Headquarters Company On 30th June, the 3rd Battalion of the 279th RCT (3/279) was located not far behind the MLR. Captain Jack Rose, Company L commander, was called to the 3/279 command post (CP) about midnight and was informed that his company was going back on the MLR in the 179th RCT sector under operational control (OPCON) of the 179th RCT. Chinese pressure was increasing in that area and the additional troops were needed to relieve the 179th RCT's A/C Company. This combined unit had been formed out of both Companys A and C because each had been so badly mauled that neither by itself was an effective combat unit. A/C Company of the 1/179 occupied the same general position that Company L of the 3/279 had occupied earlier in 1952.
On July 1, 1952, Capt Rose ordered his Company L men to man their old positions on the MLR inasmuch as they could identify them. These positions were not on Old Baldy itself but rather south of Old Baldy along the MLR. On 2 July 1952, the day after Company L took their positions on the MLR, the remainder of the 3/279 occupied positions of the MLR also.
Company K occupied the MLR to the left flank of Company L.
Lieutenant Dennis J. Harrison, commander of Company I, had the Company I CP positioned on Hill 226 which was north of the MLR about 300-400 meters. The outpost on Old Baldy (Hill 266) was about 300 meters northwest of Hill 226 and personnel from Company I took up defensive positions there although in what strength has not been determined. I suspect that at least two platoons with supporting fire elements occupied the Old Baldy outpost.
Elements of the 3/279 Weapons Company M and Regimental Medical Company were attached to the three rifle companies, I, J, and K.
Captain Rose recalled: "Throughout the day of the 3rd of July, the enemy fired artillery into the area. It was apparently registration fire because they would fire a few rounds in one area and then shift to another. The targets seemed to be the Company L front and the routes leading out of the MLR to Old Baldy and Company I."
By late afternoon of 3 July, Chinese fire intensified greatly, especially pounding Company I fortifications on Old Baldy. Company L was raked by heavy artillery fire and subjected to enemy probes just after dark. Several were wounded and Duane Helms' assistant machine gunner was killed.
Captain Rose continues: "At about 2215 hours on the night of 3 July, all Company L platoon leaders were in the CP and a long, rumbling, continuous noise like a large freight train was heard. This was the opening of the attack on Company I on Old Baldy. This was the closest I heard to a TOT (Time on Target) barrage while I was in Korea. All platoon leaders returned to their respective platoons and prepared for further orders."
About 2230 hours, the intensity of the enemy artillery barrage increased on Old Baldy. Captain Rose continues: "Our artillery was firing constantly and so was the Division Artillery. We also had priority of fire from Corps and Army also. In short order, the Air Force was dropping flares that lit up the whole area. Company L was firing in support of Company I and fired about 2-million rounds of small arms and 1000 or more 60mm mortar. The cooks had to come up to keep water poured on the mortars to prevent short rounds caused by premature cook-offs. They also carried ammunition."
At 2255 a reinforced enemy battalion attacking from the northeast stormed the Company I force manning Old Baldy. From their positions, the men of Company L provided maximum support to the besieged defenders of Old Baldy. In the light of flares from a distance, the attacking Chinese looked like swarms of ants crawling up Old Baldy.
Tremendously outnumbered by the Chinese, a number of positions manned by the Company I defenders were overrun. In fierce hand-to-hand combat, the outnumbered Thunderbirds drove the attackers back about twenty minutes after midnight of the 4th of July.
A second wave of Chinese attacking from the same direction hit Company I again about thirty minutes later in a massive assault that lasted about 20 minutes. Capt Rose, who viewed the Chinese onslaught from a distance by the light of the air force flares believed that Company I was in desperate straits. They were running low on ammunition and were in danger of being over-run.
At 2200, Captain Rose ordered Lieutenant Kenneth G. Herring to take his 2nd platoon and reinforce Company I. To reach Old Baldy, Lt Herring and his platoon had to follow a ridge leading to Hill 226 where the Company I CP was located, then continue on the ridge to Old Baldy (Hill 266).
Upon reaching the Company I CP on Hill 226, Lt Herring found the area lightly defended because what few of Company I had remained at the CP had been ordered by the Company I commander, Lt. Harrison, on up to Old Baldy to help stem the Chinese onslaught.
By 0100 hours on 4 July, the Chinese pressure was such that Lt Harrison ordered Lt Herring to move forward to Old Baldy. The enemy fire targeting the ridge leading from the Company I CP to Old Baldy was devastating. Herring, analyzing the pattern of the enemy barrages delayed his departure until the enemy artillery shifted concentrations. This enabled Herring to lead his men to the besieged Old Baldy during somewhat of a lull in the enemy fire and in doing so, minimized casualties. His platoon arrived on Old Baldy in time to assist in repulsing the second attack.
At 0210 a third and final wave of enemy troops from the west fought their way to the Thunderbird positions on Old Baldy.
They maintained fierce pressure on the perimeter defense until 0235 hours. Then the remainder of Company L arrived to reinforce the decimated Company I.
Cpl Corbin Beach, a medic assigned to Company L, moved to Old Baldy as soon as the shelling subsided to care for and evacuate the wounded. Forty years later remembered that only 71 of the 172 men of Company I were able to walk down off the hill on the morning of 4th of July 1952.
Company L took over the defense of Old Baldy for three more days after the 4th of July. The Chinese never made another attack. They had been soundly beaten and they had had enough.
Company I Thunderbirds earned three silver stars and a Bronze Star for Heroism that night of 3/4 July.
Pfc Jim Foley (posthumously) BAR man Sgt John J. Kerby (Posthumously) Rifle squad leader Sgt Robert Braaten (medic) Cpl William House (Bronze Star f/Heroism) (Rifleman) My friend, Donald D. Shaw, was killed that night, reportedly in hand-to-hand combat when a group of enemy overwhelmed his defensive position on top of Old Baldy.
Following are those KIA that night of 3/4 July 1952, almost all from Company I.
BROWN JOHN L 11223865 CHONG MARCHMONT T 50004120 COLLETT WALTER 45042039 CRAWFORD GEORGE C 53100199 DAVIS JERRY 19415653 FOLEY JAMES J 51002309 SILVR STAR GARDNER MERRITT H 51092690 GORTON WESLEY H 21913932 HILL DANIEL G 51037762 HOGARTH RAYMOND H 55041693 HOOK RUSSELL E 56092034 HUTCHISON ROBERT W 55179280 KERBY JOHN J 55028473 SILVR STAR KNORR JEROME W 55046793 LHOMMEDIEU RAYMOND 55026423 MADDEN WILLIAM H 12271724 QUEEN RUFF G 53100179 SCHWEMER HAROLD G 55046583 SHAW DONALD D 16384724 STONE CHARLES A JR 51016383 TOBIO ANTHONY F 51002296 WEEKS HOMER G 56061168 WRATHER PAUL D 14385275
The Chinese had not attempted to take the hill again until the U.S. 2nd Division relieved the 45th Division during mid July. All of the Eighth Army's corps followed a policy of rotating their divisions periodically on the line and the 45th had spent over six months at the front. The Chinese took advantage of the relief as they mounted two attacks on the night of July 17 in strengths exceeding a reinforced battalion. Through quick reinforcement of the Old Baldy outpost and heavy close defensive fires, E and F Companies, 23rd Infantry Regiment, who were defending the hill managed to repel the first Chinese assault. But the second won a foothold on the slopes which the Chinese reinforced and then exploited. Chinese artillery and mortar fire became very intense; then the Chinese infantry followed up swiftly and seized the crest. Counterattacks by the 23d Regiment supported by air strikes and artillery and mortar fire, did not succeed in driving the Chinese from the newly won positions. By July 20 the 2nd Division elements had regained only a portion of the east finger of Old Baldy. The onset of the rainy season made operations exceedingly difficult to carry out during the rest of the month.
As the torrential downpours converted the Korean battleground into a morass in the last week of July, the UNC counted its losses on Old Baldy during the month. Through July 21 the tally showed 39 killed, 234 wounded, and 84 missing for the UNC and an estimated 1,093 killed and wounded for the Chinese.
When the rain eased off at the end of July, the 23rd Infantry Regiment again sought to secure complete control of Old Baldy. Since the Chinese had an estimated two platoons on the crest, the 23rd sent two reinforced companies up the slopes after artillery and mortar preparatory fires on the Chinese positions. Edging toward the Chinese defenses, the 2nd Division forces used small arms fire and hand grenades as they reached the trenches. After bitter hand-to-hand combat, the two companies finally gained the crest early on August 1 and dug in to prepare for the customary counterattack, 200 flares were distributed around the UNC positions and 42 air sorties were flown during the day in support. That night the Chinese sent first mortar, then artillery fire at the crest, dropping an estimated 2,500 rounds on the 23d Regiment elements. But counterattacks were driven off.
Mines, bunkers, and additional wire helped to strengthen the UNC hold on Old Baldy on August 2, and extremely heavy and effective artillery fire broke up another enemy assault on August 4.
Fourth battle of Old Baldy – October 5–7
Fifth battle of Old Baldy – March 23–26, 1953
Colombia was the only Latin American country that participated in the United Nations Forces in Korea. A frigate, the ARC Almirante Padilla and an infantry battalion with 1080 men were sent to join the UN Forces in August 1951. The Colombian ground forces had been awarded for their exemplary performance in previous fighting and combat, Operations Nomad, Thunderbolt, Climber (Hill 400) and Barbula (Hill 180) with Presidential Unit Citations from the United States and South Korea and U.S. Legion of Merit, Silver Stars and Bronze Stars awarded to the men.
At the time of Old Baldy, the Colombian Battalion was part of the 7th Division under Major General Wayne C. Smith. The Colombian unit was the fourth battalion in the 31st Regiment commanded by Colonel William Kern who had ordered Lt. Colonel Alberto Ruiz Novoa, the Colombian commander to relieve the Regiment's 1st Battalion on Old Baldy.
The Colombian Battalion had just been engaged in the Battle of Yeoncheon Hill (Bárbula) in which its troops attacked the Communists' outpost, 500m from the enemy's main defense line, while carrying out preliminary duties at Mageo-ri, northwest of Yeoncheon. At dawn the Colombian Battalion C Company initiated an operation to capture Hill 180, a strongly built outpost by the PVA but faced stiff resistance. After capturing Hill 180, C Company destroyed the PVA's defense facilities. But the intelligence of the Regiment had failed. The attack should have been carried out by at least one full battalion and not just one company. The Colombian company had been hit hard and had 11 men killed, 43 wounded and 10 missing in action. Intercepted communications from the Chinese confirmed the struggle and hand-to-hand combat. The casualties were too high for C Company. They could not hold the position and were ordered to retreat.
Two days later the Battalion received orders for Old Baldy.
On their new post, Company A was placed at D and B Company on Old Baldy, going west to east and C Company was behind both, between them. The fourth company of the Colombian Battalion was used to fill in the missing men in the other three Companies which meant the whole battalion was used in the frontline. Lt. Colonel Ruiz Novoa asked the Col. Kern for reserve troops and a U.S. Company from the Regiment was assigned to the Battalion as a reserve unit.
Lt. Alfredo Forero Parra, B Company on Old Baldy recounted how a US soldier told him: "Lieutenant, we've been here for five days and the troops we replaced lasted here just about the same. This is a real cemetery. It's been taken and recovered by us about a hundred times. Our men are rotated about every five to eight days because it's hit hard by enemy fire causing innumerable casualties, demoralization and sheer tiredness."
On 20 March artillery fire was felt all over the 31st Regiment. The Colombian Battalion was on Baldy in the middle with 2nd Battalion to its left and 3rd Battalion was on Pork Chop Hill. Intercepted communications from the Chinese command and deserters confirmed the imminence of the attack, Col. Kern remained skeptical of the Colombians.
On the 21st, five bodies were exposed by the Chinese on the crest of Hill 180. Four Colombians and an American. The PVA wanted to tempt the Colombians in trying to recover them. The Colombian Commander ordered a rescue mission by volunteers from C Company. Private Alejandro Martínez Roa reached the crest, deactivated a mine under one of the bodies, descended with one of the corpses, escaped enemy fire and when he encountered other Colombian troops, returned to the crest with Corporal Pedro Limas Medina and the patrol and rescued the others. The heroic action was rewarded with four Silver Stars.
On the 22nd the softening of the Colombian position on Baldy was increased. More than 2000 rounds of cannon fire was dropped over the area.
On the 23rd, since B Company had been on the line of fire for 11 days, Col. Kern ordered C Company to rotate with B. Lt. Colonel Ruiz objected to the order. He was expecting a Chinese attack on Baldy and considered it a mistake to move his troops, his reserve unit was the US Company which he did not know, and C Company had been hit very hard on Hill 180 so he did not want to expose them yet, to more heavy fire. But Kern kept the order and the Companies started rotation. The movement began toward 15:00 under heavy fire, making it difficult for C Company to advance toward their new position. Once again the Company began receiving heavy losses. B Company was completely demoralized and demotivated. It had been under constant artillery fire since their arrival. Men were eager to rotate as soon as they heard the new orders.
Lt. Alfredo Forero Parra: "By that day our positions were seriously weakened by the enemy artillery fire. The position for my men was on the crest of Old Baldy. We were the Second Platoon in B Company. Past noon, I received orders to prepare my men to be relieved by C Company, next to us. All of us, from our combat positions were anxious to be relieved, but C Company did not arrive. I was convinced we were in for a major attack so I went and spoke with American tank commander which supported our position, and I convinced him to give us a .30 machine gun in order to enhance our defense. We had everything ready, including the flamethrower assigned to us."
The 1st Battalion of the Chinese 423rd Regiment, 141st Division, commanded by Hou Yung-chun, was selected to assault Old Baldy. The unit's 3rd Company would lead the attack. The Chinese were directly facing the battered Colombian B Company. At 20:30, A Company on Dale was attacked. After a tenacious resistance and heavy support from B and C Companies he had to give up his position.
Pork Chop Hill was also hit with the same heavy fire. The Third Battalion could not hold its position and lost the hill. Col. Kern thinking that the main objective of the attack had been Pork Chop Hill sent in two Companies to reinforce the men in the 3rd Battalion, but the fighting diminished making it possible for the 3rd Battalion to retake its position on the hill two hours later with the reinforcements received from the Regiment Command.
"Forty minutes after the attack on Dale and Pork Chop Hill, tremendously heavy artillery and mortar fire fell on Old Baldy. The earth shook as if in an earthquake accompanied by flashing and deafening explosions all around B Company's position. The fleeting silhouettes of men, weapons and weakened fortifications seemed ghosts within the enemy bursts. Cries of anguish and agony mingled with our own and enemy machine gun rattle. The battle raged at every moment. We could hear at a short distance the firing of 60 and 82 mm. mortars from the enemy. Communications were lost, no one answered, not even the squadron commanders. Suddenly, I was reported the death of my platoon Sergeant replacement, Azael Salazar Osorio, then the commander of the third squad, Corporal Jose Narvaez Moncayo, who had been severed by the waist and shouted near death, to be lifted by the feet to relieve his suffering. Nothing could be done for him. At my battle station the death of Corporal Ernesto Gonzalez Varela, commander of the second squadron, was atrocious. We were almost touching elbows. He fired his machine gun on an onslaught of Chinese who came upon us when a bazooka shell hit him on the face, leaving his head tangling on his back. I thought I was living a nightmare or horror movie until new explosions on my bunker brought me back to reality. I encouraged my men and I continued to communicate with machine guns and gave instructions for a corporal to take out the flamethrower and prepare himself to shoot the enemy when they appeared."
"A few minutes later two soldiers came running to my trench shouting, the Chinese are coming, the Chinese are coming! The enemy was trying to overcome our position shouting and shooting their machine guns and throwing grenades."
The attack was unsuccessful. The Chinese again attacked, breaking the defense and heading for our trenches. That moment C Company started arriving to relieve B Company. They were unaware of the ammo deposits, trench and foxhole distribution and defense sectors. B Company still had command over the position on the crest of the hill, but half of the men were C Company.
Lt. Colonel Ruiz was right, the main attack was on Baldy, not Pork Chop Hill, as Col. Kern had considered. C Company which had been hard hit in Hill 180 still had its men under the influence of that nightmare, and now unable to fully come to occupy their combat positions in Baldy.
A Chinese regiment had launched the attack on Dale. While the command of the regiment was distracted by with the previous attack that touched the U.S. battalion adjacent to the Colombian company, another Chinese regiment moved amid the darkness to Old Baldy, taking assault positions as a rain of artillery shells fell upon B Company's position on the crest of the hill. The bombing of that and previous days had weakened the Colombian positions, destroying much of the barbed wire and mines, leaving defenses open to a direct attack. All night they fought fiercely in the midst of the confusion caused by darkness and by the presence of the two Colombian units, half of B and half of C Companies. The situation for the defense could not be weaker. A full Chinese Battalion attacking, reinforced by two additional companies was too great a force against mere three companies of the Colombian Battalion.
Colonel Ruiz advised his intention to use the U.S. reserve company assigned to the battalion in order to counterattack, protect the troops engaged in combat and retake the lost positions. The U.S. liaison officer advised that the reserves had been used to contain the Chinese penetration on Pork Chop Hill.
The Colombians Battalion was on its own. The unit had no reserves to counterattack and fight back. Company A had had to retreat with the ferocity of the attack that preceded the one on Old Baldy, but was determined to recover their positions from the Chinese without any backup or reinforcements. B and C, in middle of the confusion of the rotation, could do absolutely nothing but try to survive.
Despite the adversity, the Colombian troops almost broke the force of the assault, as was shown by a communication intercepted by Division intelligence, in which the Chinese battalion commander Hou Yung-chun said the assault was unsuccessful and the capture of Hill 266 (Old Baldy) was impossible. The Chinese response was take it or suffer the consequences. Moments later, they announced the dispatch of reinforcements.
The efforts in defending the position depleted dramatically as the number of attackers increased and the defenders were reduced by casualties. However, the Colombians fought on, while the Chinese taking advantage of their enormous numerical superiority, had to conquer the position trench by trench in fierce hand-to-hand combat.
At about 01:00, both parties, believing that the other had captured the hill, began bombing with heavy artillery fire. Both armies despite having troops on the battlegrounds, downloaded a rain of bullets and shells on the men stranded in hand-to-hand combat trying maintain their positions. Casualties came from friendly and enemy fire alike.
At midnight only one platoon had managed to reach West View and tried to help contain part of the attack. There the Colombians awaited for reinforcements to retake the lost position which never arrived.
Alfredo Forero: "At 4:30 AM we were only six men left in B Company's Second rifle platoon, with exhausted ammunition and harassed by the enemy. We made our way towards the tank path, losing three more men due to the continuous artillery fire."
"Before midnight, the tanks in the valley were removed, leaving free entrance to the enemy. A truck with our ammunition stopped at the entrance of the position on road in the valley. From it descended Lieutenants Leonidas Parra and Miguel Ospina Rodríguez, the sappers and transmission officers, as a heavy fog covered the morning and we could hear sporadic gunshots and screams."
Lieutenant Ospina arrived with orders to try to restore communications with the Command of the Battalion, but in the stark reality of Old Baldy, there was nothing to do.
At 8:00 am a U.S. platoon arrived and was asked by the Colombians for fire support in order to retake the lost hill, but after a short reconnaissance they withdrew.
At this point the command of the Division orders the hill abandoned, and bombardment begins on Old Baldy. The Colombian Battalion had been unable to regain her men behind lines, stranded, wounded or dead. The Colombian casualties were 95 killed, 97 wounded and 30 missing, over 20% of the Battalion. The 7th Division estimated 750 Chinese were killed on Old Baldy. US forces lost 307 killed.
Chinese forces suffered 311 dead. The PVA 3rd company, 423rd regiment, 141st division were awarded the title "Hero Company of Old Bald Mountain" (Chinese:老秃山英雄连).
In the end, both sides lost many men, but the battle lines ended up back where they were in May 1952, before the first battle.
- http://www.koreanwaronline.com/history/TruceTent/Frames/295.htm. Retrieved 6 June 2017.
- Alvaro Valencia Tovar, Gabriel Puyana García (2003) En Corea por la Libertad y la Gloria, Imprenta de las Fuerzas Militares, Bogotá, ISBN 958-33-5419-8
- James I. Marino (April 2003). "Korean War: Battle on Pork Chop Hill". Military History. Archived from the original on 2006-10-30.
- The Struggle for Korea Continues May 1 – November 30, 1952. korea50.army.mil
- Walter G. Hermes. "Chapter XIII: Stalemate". Truce Tent and Fighting Front. United States Army the Korean War. United States Army Center of Military History.
- Alvaro Valencia Tovar, Jairo Sandoval Franky (2001) Colombia en la Guerra de Corea, Editorial Planeta S.A., Bogotá, ISBN 958-42-0178-6
- "Guerra en Corea El Batallón Colombia" (in Spanish). Archived from the original on October 30, 2013.
- Alejandro Martínez Roa (1974) Sangre en Corea, Gráficas Mundo Nuevo.
- United States Army Center of Military History, Korea 1951–1953, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1996, p. 278