Carloctavismo (Spanish: [kaɾloktaˈβizmo]) is a branch of Carlism, particularly active in the 1943–1953 period. In terms of dynastical allegiances it advanced the claim to the Spanish throne of Carlos Pio de Habsburgo-Lorena y de Borbón, styled as Carlos VIII, and his relatives. In terms of political line it collaborated very closely with Francoism.
During a hundred years of its history Carlism was headed by six successive claimants with clear heritage rights; however, in the early 1930s it was evident that the dynasty would soon extinguish. The pretender, Don Alfonso Carlos, was 82 when assuming the claim in 1931 and had no issue. For the first time ever the Carlists were neither clear who would be their next king nor how the issue was to be tackled. Don Alfonso Carlos seemed leaning towards a compromise with the Alfonsists, engineered though not sealed by his predecessor, Don Jaime. Such a perspective triggered protests; the dissenting Carlists claimed that a compromise with the liberal Borbón branch would be an insult to generations of their forefathers, who fought and died to topple the hated dynasty.
A Madrid Jaimista weekly El Cruzado Español was since late 1931 among the most outspoken opponents of dynastical compromise. It advocated appointing an heir during Don Alfonso Carlos’ lifetime; initially the focus was on Renato de Borbón-Parma. Headed by an ex-combatant of the Third Carlist War Juan Pérez Nájera, in February 1932 the group presented their cause in a letter to the claimant, who received them at a meeting in Toulouse but refused to bow to any pressure. The Cruzadistas, as they were already known, changed their strategy; though initially they seemed to rely on their king for nominating his heir, they began to call for a grand Carlist assembly, which would settle the issue. They did not propone any specific candidate openly and in a pamphlet by a mid-age military lawyer colonel Jesús Cora y Lira they merely laid out the basics of their reading of the succession law; however, they were already in touch with the oldest daughter of the charismatic Carlist king Carlos VII, Doña Blanca, setting their sights on her youngest son, Barcelona-resident Carlos Pio, referred to as Don Carlos. In 1933 the Cruzadistas suffered two major setbacks. Carlos Pio, following brief incarceration related to the Sanjurjo coup, moved from Spain to Vienna. Don Alfonso Carlos, tired of constant pressure, expulsed the Cruzadistas group and in 1934 convinced his grandnephew to acknowledge having no succession rights. Nevertheless, the expulsed were now free to act; having formed a group with a challenging name Núcleo de la Lealtad, in early 1935 they staged a meeting in Zaragoza. It was styled as a Magna Asamblea advocated earlier; though in private many Carlists might have sympathized with their goals, formally the gathering represented a minor offshoot grouping. It adopted a declaration that Doña Blanca was in position to transmit legitimate hereditary rights to her sons. She publicly distanced herself from the enterprise, but her position changed when in January 1936 Don Alfonso Carlos eventually decided to sort the succession issue by appointing a distant relative, Javier de Borbón-Parma, a future regent. In May 1936 Doña Blanca issued a non-compatible statement declaring that after the death of her uncle, she would accept her hereditary rights to transmit them to her youngest son.
When the Civil War broke out Cruzadistas were re-admitted to Comunión Tradicionalista. Nevertheless, some Carlist requetés—nominally loyal to Don Alfonso Carlos and after his death in September 1936 to the regent Don Javier - referred to Carlos Pio as to the future king Carlos VIII and used his name as their battle cry. Don Carlos sought permission of his granduncle to enlist to Carlist troops, but was explicitly banned from doing so; later approaches directly to Franco produced only polite refusal. After 1937 Carlos Pio and the Cruzadistas alike refrained from political activity, with key issue on Carlist agenda having been defense of own identity against the Francoist pressure to amalgamate within a new state party. After the 1939 Nationalist victory the former Cruzadista supporters raised their voice again, but in 1940 Doña Blanca declared loyalty to the regent and ignored her 1936 commitment. However, instead of dying out the issue got reinvigorated. At that time what looked like a typical dynastical dispute overlapped with political fragmentation of Carlism, triggered mostly by different views on policy towards Francoism. It soon became evident that many Carlists skeptical about intransigent opposition, mounted by Don Javier, started to look to Don Carlos as to a royal alternative.
Background: Spain in 1943
After 1936 the emerging Francoist state left the monarchist question parked in obscurity; feeble maneuvers on part of the Alfonsists and the Carlists were dismissed on the ground of wartime necessities. In the early 1940s the monarchist pressure started to mount. The Alfonsist claimant Don Juan, who in 1941–1942 courted Hitler about overthrowing Franco and setting up an authoritarian monarchy, changed his strategy. Now converted to constitutionalism, in March 1943 he addressed Franco with a letter, denouncing the regime as provisional and urging swift monarchical restoration; the response read that restoration based on dynastical or political continuity was out of the question. In June Franco received the most direct challenge so far, when 26 Cortes deputies signed a letter recommending that traditional state institutions be re-introduced. In August Don Juan dispatched another, increasingly bold message, countered shortly afterwards by a note from the Carlist leader, who warned that a future monarchy must be a Traditionalist, not a Liberal one. In September 1943 Franco faced a serious threat to his rule: majority of the most senior army generals signed a letter, in polite but ultimative terms demanding restoration of the monarchy. It was only with greatest difficulty that caudillo managed to talk them into compliance.
The international context of Francoism changed dramatically in 1942–1944. In the early 1940s the Allies were chiefly concerned with preventing Spain from joining the Axis; though unhappy about fascistoid nature of the regime, they could have not afforded ruining their relations with Madrid by challenging Franco's internal policy. The war developments of 1942–1943, especially the Anglo-American landing in North-Western Africa, German military disasters at Stalingrad and in Tunisia and the fall of Mussolini made Spain's entry into war a non-issue. In 1943 the official propaganda of the Allies already marketed a hostile vision of Spain; an American newsreel presented it as a fascist country and anti-Francoist tones in BBC broadcasts elicited protest even from a British press attaché in Madrid. However, the mounting Allied pressure was directed at preventing Spanish supplies to Germany rather than at toppling the regime. In late 1943 the Allied demands regarding termination of shipments to the Nazis became ultimative and spelled the threat of total fuel embargo, which indeed early next year would prove its effectiveness by bringing the Spanish economy to its knees in just two months. The public opinion and politicians in Britain and the United States were turning firmly against Franco. In late 1943 the dictator started to consider an Allied invasion a more likely threat than a German one and soon ordered re-grouping of the Spanish army accordingly.
The increasing domestic monarchist fronde and the international pressure combined convinced Franco that a national-syndicalist regime built so far needed major re-dressing. As following the so-called Begoña crisis the chief architect of totalitarian state, Ramón Serrano Suñer, was already sidetracked, in 1943 the dictator embarked on first major redefinition of the system. The Falangist threads were slightly de-emphasized, while more focus on Catholic and traditional values was combined with efforts to distinguish between the Spanish and the Axis regimes. A quasi-parliament was intended to institutionalize the system and provide it with a non-dictatorial image. Last but not least, caudillo began to consider the monarchist solution seriously. In his trademark style balancing different political groupings, Franco decided to keep supporters of both dynastical options in check by pursuing two paths at the same time. The decreasingly cooperative but still tractable Alfonsist pretender Don Juan was invited to live in Spain, the offer which was ultimately turned down. The intransigent Carlist regent Don Javier was ignored first when trapped in Vichy France and later when arrested by Gestapo and detained in Dachau, but Carlos Pio was welcome in Spain.
Carloctavista claim and its reception
The Carloctavista claim relied upon the theory developed earlier by the Cruzadistas. The Carlist succession doctrine was based on a French Salic Law, upon its implementation in Spain in the early 18th century modified as Semi-Salic Law. It specified that by default the throne is inherited by males. Later in the 19th century the Carlist doctrine developed into a theory of so-called double legitimacy, namely that a king must by legitimate also by execution, the latter amounting to compliance with Traditionalist principles. Supporters of Carlos VIII advanced a theory, embraced already in 1914 by Vázquez de Mella, that according to the 1713 law an oldest daughter of a legitimate ruler in some circumstances might inherit the succession rights. Since Alfonso Carlos and the second last Carlist king Don Jaime had no children, they focused on Doña Blanca as the oldest daughter of the third last Carlist king, Carlos VII.
The highlight on Doña Blanca shocked many Carlists, convinced that the theory turned Carlism on its head; the movement was triggered by opposition to violation of the 1713 law by Fernando VII, who in 1830 declared his daughter Isabel the future queen. Supporters of Carlos Pio responded that the analogy was false. First, Doña Isabel violated heritage rights of her uncle, while in case of Doña Blanca there was no legitimate male heir. Second, Doña Isabel executed the heritage rights with respect to herself as a queen, while Doña Blanca was merely to transmit them to her son. Another challenge pointed to Don Carlos having been the fifth son of Doña Blanca. The response read that while the oldest brother died with no issue, the other three have excluded themselves from heritage by concluding morganatic marriages and by non-compliance with double legitimacy theory. The first of these arguments turned against Carlos Pio in 1938, when he concluded a morganatic marriage as well; the issue was then played down until 1949, when abandoned by his wife he requested in Vatican that the marriage be declared invalid. Finally, there were other counter-arguments quoted.
From the Alfonsist perspective all the above was irrelevant debates between supporters of usurper dynasty. The Alfonsists were almost entirely united behind their candidate, Don Juan; only minor controversies related to his older brother, who on basis of his disability renounced all heritage rights in 1933 to backtrack in 1941 and to declare himself head of the House of Bourbon and legitimate heir to the French throne.
Franco's views on monarchy are not entirely clear. He was a loyal subject of Alfonso XIII, who sort of courted his young officer personally. Hence, during the Republic years the Alfonsists were somewhat disappointed by Franco standing clear of monarchist initiatives. His engagement in military plot of 1936 was not motivated by monarchist zeal; like most of the plotters he was bent on confronting proto-revolutionary Left and preventing apparent implosion of the state. During the Civil War he remained highly ambiguous about a would-be restoration, at some stage concluding that sort of it might be necessary as means of sustaining the regime. He cared little about dynastical debates and it seems compliance with his own vision and acceptance of his own leadership were the key criteria of choice. The dictator appreciated Carlism as its anti-democratic outlook to a large extent overlapped his own, but realized also that within the Spanish society it was a minority option and an Alfonsist candidate was more practicable, especially that Alfonsist sympathies prevailed among the top military. Since heads of both branches, Don Juan and Don Javier, refused to be domesticated, caudillo concluded he should proceed on monarchist path as slowly as possible and keeping all options opened. It seems that at that stage Franco considered nothing settled except that a future king is appointed on his own terms.
Since mid-1938 Don Carlos lived near Viareggio. None of the sources clarifies origins of his move back to Spain in early 1943; in particular it remains obscure whether it was himself or the Francoist authorities who initiated the transfer. Most scholars agree, however, that when in March the family settled in Barcelona, the move must have been at least approved by Franco. Cora y Lira, who after death of Pérez Nájera emerged as the key supporter of Carlos Pio, regularly visited El Pardo; he agreed with caudillo's entourage and with some key Falangists alike that he would soon commence a promotional campaign of the pretender. After Doña Blanca in May reverted to her 1936 pledge and claimed first assuming and then transmitting heritage rights to her youngest son, on June 29, 1943 the latter issued a manifesto, effectively claiming the monarchical succession. The document did not use the name of Carlos VIII and contained no reference to Francoism except a single note on Franco, who fights “peligros como rodean la Patria.”
Supporters of Don Carlos, now named Carloctavistas and again expulsed from the Comunión, started to organize themselves. General Cora y Lira was appointed secretario general of the new claimant, who set up also his Consejo General and embarked on forming Comunión Católico-Monárquica and Juventudes Carlistas, carefully styled not to challenge the ban on all political parties except FET. Enjoying total freedom of movement and accompanied by the police he commenced touring the country. This campaign, exercised in 1944–1946, was aimed at promoting the pretender without seeking massive adhesions; the Octavista political strategy relied upon supporting the regime and ignoring its differences with the Traditionalist doctrine; many of its leaflets featured the "Franco y Carlos VIII" slogan. The official policy was permissive though short of direct endorsement: government and local officials did not attend Carloctavista meetings, however, few Carloctavista supporters landed high admin jobs themselves. The mainstream press were permitted to mention him on the societé rather than political columns. Nevertheless, it remained striking that Don Carlos was the only royal claimant travelling across Spain and openly promoting his cause.
Octavistas were in acute conflict both with mainstream Carlism, loyal to the regency of Don Javier and intransigently opposed to Francoism, and with collaborative branch headed by conde Rodezno and leaning towards dynastic accord with Don Juan. This occasionally led to violent clashes, like in December 1945 in Pamplona. The Carloctavista strength was that many Carlists, tired of semi-clandestine status and envious about open campaign of Don Carlos, were getting increasingly irritated by what they considered inefficient overdue regency. The Carloctavista weakness was that many Carlists saw Carlos Pio as a Francoist puppet, animated with the sole purpose to confuse. As a result, the Carloctavistas, initially referred to as "elites with no supporters", attracted significant backing, though they did not manage to dominate the Javieristas. Some authors claim Carloctavistas might have equaled Javieristas in terms of popularity, enjoying most support in Navarre and in Catalonia. They controlled some of the Carlist periodicals; the highest-positioned though not particularly vehement Octavista supporter was Esteban Bilbao; other nationally known figures included Antonio Iturmendi, Joaquín Bau, Jaime del Burgo and Antonio Lizarza Irribaren; many Carloctavistas were politicians known locally.
The climax of Carloctavista bid fell on 1947–1948. Amidst the nadir of international ostracism, Franco decided to make a first formal step towards a monarchy and launched a campaign in favour of Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del Estado, the document which for the first time officially declared Spain a monarchy. The law left designation of the future king almost entirely in hands of Franco and did not contain a single reference to hereditary claims; it infuriated both Don Juan and Don Javier, who immediately addressed the dictator with protest letters. Don Carlos was from the onset fully supportive of the law and appeared in propaganda campaign related to the 1947 referendum, very cautiously featured in official media like weekly newsreels. At that time some suspected that the law itself might have been written with Carlos VIII in mind.
In 1947–48 the international politics turned a corner and though the image of Spain as quasi-enemy from the Second World War lingered, it was getting replaced by perception of quasi-ally in the just commencing Cold War; this rendered monarchist redressing of the regime less urgent. On the other hand, what looked like Franco playing the Carlos VIII card might have worked with regard to Don Juan, who finally agreed to meet the dictator. During their August 1948 encounter it was settled that a 10-year-old son of the claimant, Juan Carlos, would be sent to Spain to continue his education, which indeed took place in November that year. The position of Don Carlos changed dramatically. Though no commitments with regard to Don Juan's son were made and according to the Law of Succession he could be crowned no earlier than in 1968, the regime made a small but visible step towards a would-be Alfonsist restoration. Another blow came in mid-1949, when Christa Satzger abandoned Don Carlos and in Reno obtained an express Nevada-style divorce. This shattered his image of a model Catholic family man and though he requested the marriage be declared void by the Church so that he could remarry, the perspective of a legitimate male descendant became unlikely either in the near future or at all.
The Carloctavistas kept supporting their cause by organizing royal trips, meetings and congresses. In 1948 Juventudes Carlistas published anonymous program booklet; the doctrine was summarized in a long title, El carlismo no quiere ni una Monarquía absoluta, ni una Monarquía liberal, ni un Estado totalitario, ni un Estado policíaco. The work advanced a fairly Traditionalist vision, founded on monarchical, Catholic, regionalist and organicist threads; it contained no reference to caudillaje system, by no means endorsed Falangist national-syndicalism and when discussing social issues focused on gremialist structures instead. What differed it from orthodox Carlism was that modernizing effort prevailed over focus on tradition; it contained even some democratic references stressing total mobility of the society, unheard of in tradition-entrenched typical Carlist outlook.
The grouping was getting internally divided. 1950 saw emergence of Juntas de Ofensivas de Agitación Carloctavista and Movimiento de Agitación Social Católico Monárquista, two initiatives not agreed with Cora y Lira and apparently confronting his strategy of total commitment to Franco. Two years later they were complemented by Frente Nacional Carlista; it is not clear whether these attempts were discussed with the claimant. In 1950 Francisco Javier Lizarza Inda published La sucesión legítima a la corona de España, a full-blown lecture of Octavista claim; re-issued in 1951, it won only those convinced already. After a few years of endless petitioning, in 1952 Franco formally received Don Carlos during their only personal meeting; on part of the dictator the move was probably intended to counter Don Javier, who just a month earlier had terminated the Carlist regency and launched his personal claim to the throne. There is no record of their one-hour-conversation, though afterwards Carlos Pio remained ecstatic; feelings were running high also when later that year Franco accepted a Carlos-VIII-created Orden de San Carlos Borromeo.
Any official, semi-official or unofficial endorsement of Don Carlos's claim on part of the regime failed to materialize before in late 1953 he unexpectedly died of cerebral hemorrhage. Though chain-smoker, he was of rather good health, which immediately triggered rumours about a possible assassination attempt; since not a shadow of proof was unearthed, they remained nothing but speculations. Funeral celebrations assumed unexpectedly high-profile; though Franco did not attend, many other top state officials did. Even the popular pro-Alfonsist daily ABC, which maintained almost perfect blackout on Carlos VIII during the previous ten years, now felt it safe to acknowledge his death; a two-page editorial praised his anti-communism and dwelt on trivia like his affection to motor sports, but did not utter a single word about his royal claim.
Demise (after 1953)
The orphaned Carloctavistas found themselves in total disarray. Most of them, perceiving their cause as hopeless, withdrew to privacy, a few started to near the Javieristas, while almost none joined supporters of Don Juan, by another Carlist branch considered the legitimate heir. Those sticking to the Octavista line focused their attention on different relatives of Don Carlos. Cora y Lira advanced the cause of his older brother, Don Antonio, who seemed leaning towards some sort of political activity. Early 1954 Cora convinced most members of Comunión Católico-Monárquica executive to welcome Don Antonio as Carlos IX, the move which caught him by surprise. Following brief vacillation period, later that year Don Antonio declared that he would not assume any political activity. Most Carloctavista leaders were overwhelmed by this sequence of disasters and sensed that their cause was turning into a grotesque; one of them concluded that "estamos, queridos compañeros, en el más absoluto y completo de los ridículos".
There were some, however, who were determined to go on. Jaime del Burgo suggested that the oldest daughter of Carlos Pio, a 14-year-old Doña Alejandra, is declared "abanderada provisional" so that she could transmit hereditary rights to her future son. Cora y Lira promoted the cause of Don Antonio's 17-year-old son Don Domingo and launched fund-raising campaign to facilitate his settling in Spain, until in 1955 furious might-have-been Carlos IX expulsed Cora for "arbitrario ejercicio del mando". Don Antonio performed a U-turn in 1956: he officially declared himself heir to the Carlist throne and nominated Lizarza Iribarren his delegate in Spain. The confusion was almost total when the same year another brother of late Don Carlos, Don Francisco José, challenged his older sibling and claimed monarchic rights himself, his key supporter turned Cora y Lira.
During the following few years the two brothers—none of them living in Spain—advertised their own claims, e.g. Don Antonio by issuing royal manifestos in the late 1950s and Don Francisco José by fighting nobility-related legal battles before Spanish courts in the early 1960s. In 1961 Don Antonio retired into privacy and Lizarza negotiated formal re-integration of the Antonianos into Comunión; eventually only many local leaders - though not Lizarza himself - in 1962 decided to join the Javieristas and were accepted by Valiente. Don Francisco José in the mid-1960s reduced his activity to few isolated episodes. In 1966 he volunteered to the Spanish embassy in Vienna to declare support for Ley Orgánica del Estado, just to be subject to a referendum; in 1968 a small group of his supporters showed up at the massive Javierista gathering at Montejurra, staging sort of a semi-suicidal provocation. His cause was supported by few periodicals, mostly ¡Carlistas! In 1969 Pueblo, a publication issued by Organización Sindical, published a lengthy interview with Don Francisco José; it was probably part of the last-minute Falangist attempt to block official designation of Don Juan Carlos as the future king.
The Octavistas received what looked like a mortal blow in 1969, with death of the most dedicated supporter of the cause Cora y Lira, even though Don Francisco José passed away in 1975 and Don Antonio in 1987. In the mid 1980s most Carloctavistas, reduced to hardly active minuscule grouplets, merged into a united Traditionalist organization, Comunión Tradicionalista Carlista, which refrained from endorsing any specific claimant or branch. In the Spanish public discourse the Carloctavistas are currently present mostly thanks to a handful of websites, featuring Don Antonio's son as the legitimate king of Spain. Indeed, Don Domingo, residing mostly in New York, decided to raise the claim himself. Though in his 20s he was totally ignorant and indeed indifferent to the Carlist cause, now he styles himself as king and sporadically issues documents like Proclamación de Don Domingo de Habsburgo-Borbón y Hohenzollern, Rey legitimo de España. The eldest daughter of Carlos Pio lives in Barcelona, and the other in New York; since the early 1960s they maintain no links with Carlism.
Reception and legacy
Within Carlism the dynastic legitimacy of the Carloctavista claim is still disputed. In general historiography this question remains a minor if not a barely noticed issue. The prevailing theory is that Octavismo owed its political standing to the Francoist policy of checks and balances rather than to the scale of genuine popular support for Carlos VIII. There are, however, vastly different views related to autonomous or non-autonomous character of the movement.
The most bold opinion holds that Carloctavismo was by and large invented by the Francoist regime. This reading is sustained mostly by historians related to Francoism and to Partido Carlista; the latter openly pursue their partisan judgment by naming the Carloctavista supporters "traitors". In some works they acknowledge Cruzadista origins of the movement; in some they present it as almost entirely fabricated by Franco, who pulled his pet claimant out of a hat with the sole purpose to distract the monarchists. The authors from this school claim that for some time the Francoist regime not only tolerated, but in fact promoted and financed Don Carlos, whose adventure was scarcely more than an "appendix to Francoism". At times they specifically identify hard-line syndicalist groups as genuine architects of the plot, quoting claims made by Falangists or ex-Falangists themselves and identifying José Luis Arrese as "el inventor" of Carlos VIII. In few works historians representing such perspective note that neither the invention nor the sustention theory has been proven yet, though that they were widely believed to have been correct at the time.
Many scholars refrain from presenting Carloctavistas as mere puppets of the regime and acknowledge genuine support the group enjoyed. Some of them, both in Spain and abroad, repeat—with reservations or unconditionally—the thesis of financial support lent by the regime, even as late as in the 1960s. Others perform review of different views and limit themselves to concluding that Francoism either was at least amicably tolerating the Carloctavistas or it was lending them at least non-financial forms of support. The collaborationist Octavista line is presented as genuine. Some see it as a conscious political strategy, an attempt aimed at gaining room for open activity and possibly using Francoism as a vehicle for crowning a Carlist king. Some see it as rooted in Carloctavista theoretical framework, to a large extent overlapping with the official doctrine, and wrap up by claiming that "with no doubt, Octavism was either Carlism of the Francoists or Francoism of the offshoot Carlists".
The thesis of fully autonomous character of Carloctavismo is advanced mostly by its activists or their descendants. They focus on pre-Francoist, Cruzadista origins of Don Carlos' claim, dwell on extended network of his supporters and vehemently deny having accepted financial support from the regime. Authors of major monographs on the movement—two out of three not Carloctavistas themselves though certainly Left-wing sympathizers neither—tend to share this perspective. Their works relate the origins of the movement to profound dynastical crisis within Carlism, later enhanced by political fragmentation and bewilderment of Traditionalism resulting from different strategies adopted towards Francoism. Within this perspective, theoretical outlook of the Octavistas is described as having had little in common with Falangist national-syndicalism and having been rather deeply anchored in Traditionalist thought. One scholar suggests Don Carlos stood a real chance of becoming a king, ruined by his wife, who tarnished his image and deprived him of future male descendency. These authors presents Carloctavista stand versus the so-called Rodeznistas, a collaborative and pro-Juanista branch of Carlism, as vehement opposition. Carloctavista support for the regime is presented as an attempt to outsmart the dictator and use the Francoist political setting for own political goals.
- Don Carlos
- Don Javier
- Don Juan
- Don Antonio
- Don Francisco Jose
- Jesús Cora y Lira
- Jaime del Burgo Torres
- Sometimes also carlosoctavismo, carlooctavismo, carlos-octavismo, carlo-octavismo, octavismo.
- shortly after assuming the claim in late October 1931, Don Alfonso Carlos wrote to the deposed Alfonso XIII: "yo no figuro más que como el puente" [between two dynasties], quoted after Francisco de las Heras y Borrero, Un pretendiente desconocido. Carlos de Habsburgo. El otro candidato de Franco, Madrid 2004, ISBN 8497725565, p. 29
- known as Pacto de Territet, see e.g. Eduardo Gonzales Calleja, El ex-Rey, in: Javier Moreno Luzón (ed.), Alfonso XIII: un político en el trono, Barcelona 2003, ISBN 9788495379597, p. 417
- some scholars claim that it was the Carlist leaders who balked at the agreement, see Gonzales Calleja 2003, p. 417, the others point to opposition among the rank-and-file, see José Carlos Clemente Muñoz, El carlismo en su prensa, 1931–1972, Madrid 1999, ISBN 9788424508159, p. 79
- Eduardo González Calleja, La prensa carlista y falangista durante la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil (1931–1937), [in:] El Argonauta Espanol 9 (2012), available here
- its first issue appeared on July 25, 1929; the periodical was set up by Circula Jaimista de Madrid, Manuel de Santa Cruz [Alberto Ruiz de Galarreta], Apuntes y documentos para la historia del tradicionalismo español: 1939–1966, vol. 3, Seville 1979, p. 27. A Carlist circle under the same name and sharing the same vision was set up in Bilbao in the early 1930s, Santa Cruz 1979, p. 28
- Jordi Canal, El carlismo. Dos siglos de contrarrevolución en España, Madrid 2000, ISBN 9788420639475, p. 306
- Melchor Ferrer, Breve historia del legitimismo español, Madrid 1958, p. 43
- and accompanied by a manifesto titled A todos los leales de la Tradición, Ferrer 1958 p. 113; it was signed by Pedro de Apodaca, Juan Pérez de Nájera, Antonio Redondo, Emilio Deán, Ramón Cómas, Rafael Hidalgo de Morillo, Juan Vicedo Calatayud, Bibiano Esteban, Jaime Martínez Rubio and Francisco A. Jiménez, Ferrer 1958, p. 43
- in June 1932
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 35
- concise lecture on Cruzadistas and beginnings of carloctavismo–from the opposite viewpoint—in Jesús Pabón, La otra legitimidad, Madrid 1965, pp. 94–101
- "designar a su debido secesor según los leyes y procedimientos tradicionales", El Cruzado Español 25.06.32
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 35–36
- Jesús de Cora y Lira, El futuro Caudillo de la Tradición Española – Estudio Jurídico, Histórico y Político, Madrid 1932
- though born in Austria as Karl Pius von Habsburg-Lothringen-Toskana, as a ten-year-old he settled with his parents in Barcelona and unlike his older brothers, demonstrated reactionary outlook and vivid interest in the Carlist cause. His oldest brother, Rainer, died with no issue in 1930; the further two, Leopold (later referred to as Don Leopoldo) and Anton (Don Antonio), lived outside Spain and shown no interest in Spanish affairs; the fourth one, Franz Josef (Don Francisco José), lived in Barcelona but did not seem interested in politics
- the issue of Carlos Pio taking part in the Sanjurjo coup is not clear. Some scholars suspect that he was indeed involved, some suggest he fell victim to blind Republican vengeance, and some claim he was arrested somewhat accidentally. According to the latter theory, the crowd assaulted his car confusing crowned logo of the Real Automóvil Club with a monarchist emblem; Carlos Pio defended his property and the brawl soon escalated , leading to his arrest, Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 61–62
- Canal 2000, p. 306
- during a personal meeting; in the mid-1930s both Don Alfonso Carlos and Don Carlos lived in Vienna
- which he did in a letter to the Carlist political leader Manuel Fal: "agradezco de todo corazón que [my supporters] hayan pensado en mí; pero debo declarar al mismo tiempo que no tengo derecho a esa sucesión", full text Melchor Ferrer, Historia del tradicionalismo español vol XXX, Sevilla 1979, p. 59; Don Carlos wrote also a document directed directly to the Cruzadistas, vol. XXX, p. 60
- Ferrer 1979, vol. XXX, p. 70. Many authors from the onset, i.e. from the early 1931, refer to Cruzadistas and to Nucleo de la Lealtad, see e.g. Santa Cruz 1979 vol. 3, pp. 26–27
- Pabón 1965, p. 113, Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939, Cambridge 2008, ISBN 9780521207294, p. 216. Some authors claim that the Cruzadistas went even further and declared Carlos Pio the legitimate heir, Canal 2000, p. 319. The text published in the press in 1935 as allegedly adopted by the assembly read that "nuestra inclinación hacia el Archiduque Don Carlos", Santa Cruz 1979, vol. 3, p. 29. Alfonso Carlos promptly disauthorised the gathering, Ferrer 1979, vol. XXX, pp. 58–59
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 40
- Don Alfonso Carlos’ great-great-grandfather (king Carlos III) and Don Javier’s great-great-great-great-grandfather (Felipe I de Parma) were brothers
- Doña Blanca declared that she would accept "los derechos que me pertenecen a la corona de España, para transmitírlos a mi amado hijo Carlos, en quíen las circunstancias de los demás hermanos, designan como mi heredero", Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 44
- Ferrer 1979, vol. XXX, p. 37
- see Tercio de Nuestra Señora de Begoña, [in:] requetés.com website, available here. Also a Carlist periodical La Fe concluded on 19.07.36 that if Don Javier were indeed to become a regent, the only option was to counter this and declare Carlos Pio the king, César Alcalá, Cruzadistas y carloctavistas: historia de una conspiración, Barcelona 2012, ISBN 9788493884253, pp. 192–194.
- Franco replied that would-be candidates to the throne "no deberían formar parte de unidades combatientes, pues, sin prejuzgar la solución dinastíca, entendia que deberian reservarse para la paz", José Luis Vila San Juan, Los Reyes Carlistas, Barcelona 1993, ISBN 8408010514, p. 215
- in 1940 Jaime del Burgo and a number of Navarrese priests issued a statement to this respect, Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 52. The person indicated as the one who renewed the campaign was Ignacio Careaga, Santa Cruz 1979, vol. 2, p. 110
- Santa Cruz 1979, vol. 5, pp. 109–115
- a new letter to Fal, demanding termination of the regency, nomination of the king, and suggesting Carlos Pio, was issued by Navarros headed by Lizarza in April 1941, Santa Cruz 1979, vol. 3, p. 49
- Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime, 1936–1975, Madison 2011, ISBN 978-0299110741, p. 369
- Payne 2011, pp. 294–95. Neither Carlos Pio seemed averse towards closing ranks with Hitler, as in 1941 he volunteered to División Azul; his offer was acknowledged but rejected, see ABC 26.12.53, available here, also Montells y Galán 1995, available here Archived 2011-09-29 at the Wayback Machine. The Navarrese individuals known for their Cruzadista sympathies used to invite Nazi officials to Pamplona feasts, triggering protest on part of the local Carlist leader, Baleztena, Manuel Martorell Pérez, La continuidad ideológica del carlismo tras la Guerra Civil [PhD thesis in Historia Contemporanea, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia], Valencia 2009, p. 185
- Payne 2011, p. 325
- Franco replied that a would-be monarchy must be based on Francoist principles and that Don Juan was merely a potential successor, Payne 2011, p. 326
- Payne 2011, p. 327
- Payne 2011, p. 328
- Payne 2011, pp. 328–29
- "in 1943 the international panorama in which Franco operated had changed dramatically", Paul Preston, Franco. A biography, London 2011, ISBN 9780006862109, p. 484
- in 1940 the British even agreed to conditionally re-open the case of Gibraltar, pledging to commence talks on its status after the war is over, Preston 2011, pp. 367, 389
- in 1940 the British ambassador to Madrid Hoare viewed the perspective of overthrowing Franco as "sheer temerity", Preston 2011, p. 367. This did not prevent him from cultivating a group of potentially rebellious generals and making vague hints about a new, democratic Spain, possibly with Don Juan as king, wide amnesty and autonomy establishments for the Basques and the Catalans; he considered Aranda the most likely leader of an anti-Francoist pronunciamento, but realized also that “no individual general is strong enough to stand up to against Franco", Richard Wigg, Churchill and Spain: The Survival of the Franco Regime, 1940–1945, London 2005, ISBN 9781845192839, pp. 48, 74, 97
- before the Allied landing in North-Western Africa both the Americans and the British ensured Franco that he had nothing to fear on their part, Payne 2011, p. 313
- especially the fall of Mussolini and Spanish diplomatic reports on anti-fascist vengeance ruling the streets of Rome sent chills down Franco’s spine, Payne 2011, pp. 328–29
- in 1943 Franco, previously apparently enjoying snubbing British and American ambassadors, made a first effort to court them, Preston 2011, p. 491
- the American 1943 propaganda newsreel „Inside the fascist Spain” elicited official protest from Madrid, Payne 2011, p. 332
- Robert Cole, Britain And The War Of Words In Neutral Europe 1939-45: The Art Of The Possible, London 1990, ISBN 9781349205813, p. 164
- in late 1943 Hoare reported to London: “the present Spanish government with Franco at its head is fundamentally hostile to the Allies” and the American ambassador Hayes noted that “this idiot is digging his own grave”, Preston 2011, pp. 503, 507; however, Cadogan in the Foreign Office kept recommending that “the policy of HMG remains one of strict non-intervention in Spain’s internal affairs", Wigg 2005, p. 96
- between early Feb and early May 1944; during the usual 1. April parade in Madrid there were no tanks and armored vehicles taking part due to fuel shortages, Preston 2011, p. 511
- in February 1944, Payne 2011, p. 334
- in late 1944 the Anglo-American policy towards Franco was not crystallised yet. Attlee and Eden pressed to adopt “whatever [except military] methods are available to assist in bringing about its [the regime] downfall", but Churchill was far less bold, Preston 2011, p. 519. At that time there were widespread rumors that the Allies were going to replace Franco with a government of Miguel Maura, Preston 2011, p. 522. Early 1945 Churchill bluntly stated to Franco that his regime was considered “unfortunate anomaly”, Preston 2011, p. 523. It was only in the spring of 1945 that the British and the Americans adopted a clear stand. Any straightforward attempt (by military means or otherwise) at toppling Franco was rejected, as there was no clear alternative and a risk of triggering another civil war loomed. London and Washington agreed to diplomatic measures of enforcing de-fascization and democratization of the regime, hoping that a regime “based on democratic principles” would eventually come, Preston 2011, pp. 525–526
- Payne 2011, pp. 319–321
- Payne 2011, p. 322
- Payne 2011, p. 324
- "with an eye on Anglo-Saxon opinion, Franco made vague promises of forthcoming elections and extremely confusing hints about the installation of a new monarchy", Preston 2011, p. 510
- Payne 2011, p. 348
- Blinkorn 2008, p. 309, Francisco Javier Caspistegui Gorasurreta, El naufragio de las ortodoxias: el carlismo, 1962–1977, Pamplona 1997, ISBN 9788431315641, p. 13
- Robert Vallverdú Martí, La metamorfosi del carlisme català: del "Déu, Pàtria i Rei" a l'Assamblea de Catalunya (1936–1975), Montserrt 2014, ISBN 9788498837261, p. 122, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 309
- full text of the 1713 law in Román Oyarzun, Pretendientes al trono de España, Barcelona 1965, pp. 15–21; see especially (translation from the original Latin into Spanish) that in case of all male lines extinguished, "la sucesión de estos reinos pertenecerá a la hija o hijas nacidas de constante matrimonio del último reinante varón", Oyarzun 1965, p. 18
- Ferrer 1958, pp. 113–14. Also some opponents of the Carloctavista reading from the mainstream camp did agree that such a reading of sem-Salic law was legitimate, compare Oyarzun 1965, pp. 10–11, Ramón Oyarzun, Historia del carlismo, Madrid 1969, p. 547. For authors currently holding this theory valid see e.g. Vila-San-Juan 1993, José María Montells y Galán, La otra dinastia. 1833–1975, Madrid 1995, ISBN 9788492001651, in English and online available here Archived 2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine
- "con el llamamiento femenino, venía a chocar con la tradición carlista", Santa Cruz 1979, vol. 3, p. 54
- interpretation advanced by Cruzadistas was most comprehensively challenged by Fernando Polo in his ¿Quién es el Rey? (1949). Since then his theory has been repeated in many works discussing the succession rights, written either by authors loyal to Don Javier or those—like Francisco Elías de Tejada—who supported alternative theories, e.g. in favor of the Portuguese claimant Dom Eduarte Nuño de Braganza
- namely by displaying no interest in the Carlist cause. In 1947 two older brothers have formally renounced their heritage rights
- see e.g Oyarzun 1965, pp. 11–12. His reading involved also a Jewish thread: "archiduque Carlos (q. e. g. e.) no reunia las condiciones que la Ley Sálica exigia, por varias razones, siendo una de ellas que estaba en relaciones, en el momento de oferta, con una bella señorita de Budapest sin titulo alguno nobiliario ni categoría social y que era de origen judio, si no en un ciento por ciento, sí en un porcentaje suficiente para invalidarla como aspirante al trono de España"
- e.g. that the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht explicitly excluded the Habsburg-Lothringen branch from Spanish hereditary rights, Oyarzun 1965, p. 12. Another point was that Carlos Pio was by his paternal grandmother descendant to the Borbón-Two Sicilies branch, which according to the Carlist reading excluded themselves from heritage by recognising usurper rule of the Alfonsists, ¿Quién es el Rey?, Madrid 1967, p. 204. One more interpretation read that the Semi-Salic Law should be applied not starting with the first Carlist king Carlos V but with the last king which ruled all the Spains, e.g. Felipe V; in this case with all male descendant branches extuinguished or excluded, heritage rights rested with Felipe V’s daughter Joaquína Carlota, who transmitted it to her male descendants, the last of them having been Dom Duarte Nuño, Ferrer 1979, vol. XXX, pp. 71–72
- apart from very early promotion to general, rendering Franco the youngest European general of his time, Alfonso XIII nominated him gentilhombre de Cámara and was (per procura) godfather of Franco’s daughter
- many key conspirators, like Mola, Cabanillas or Queipo de Llano, considered themselves republicans and defenders of the Republic against a bolshevik revolution
- following every major victory he used to send a kind informative telegraph message to Alfonso XIII, but having taken Madrid in 1939 Franco failed to do so, Preston 2011, p. 325. On the other hand, already in 1937 he made it clear to the deposed king that there would be no simple restoration, Preston 2011, p. 291
- "at the back of his mind, he may have intended eventually to restore the monarchy but it was a distant perspective", Preston 2011, p. 274
- there is no monograph dealing with Franco’s views on monarchist restoration and the rivalry between the Carlists and the Alfonsists. Most popular English-language works presenting development of Franco’s ideas on the regime of Spain are respective chapters in two massive though definitely competivive syntheses, Payne 2011 and Preston 2011
- Ley de la Jefatura del Estado, adopted in August 1939, maintained total silence on the monarchist question and effectively ensured "more direct personal dictatorship than those of the Soviet Union, Italy, or Germany", Payne 2011, p. 234
- exact date of Carlos Pio’s transfer from Austria (since the spring of 1938 incorporated into Germany) to Italy is not clear. In May 1938 he was still in Vienna, where he got married. One work provides picturesque details of the transfer to Italy but does not give an exact date. It might be understood that Doña Blanca with her daughter Dolores, Don Carlos and his newly wed wife moved some time late spring or early summer 1938, either fleeing the Nazi rule or fleeing the threat of war; at that time Italy was considered a safe heaven unlikely to be involved in military conflict, Bertita Harding, The Lost Waltz, New York 1944, p. 270
- Tenuta Reale, traditional property of Carlos Pio maternal grandmother’s family, underwent rocky times since the 19th century. During World War I it was seized by the Italian army as part of their proofing ground. It was reclaimed by Doña Blanca, though its status remained very sensitive; during the Second World War the Italian army again located troops on the estate. The move was welcomed by the family, happy that it prevented the estate from looting. Detailed discussion of this and other Doña Blanca’s properties in Harding 1944, pp. 201–204, 270–273
- some scholars suggest that it was Franco who brought Carlos Pio to Spain, but they provide no source; see e.g. "don Carlos fue traído a España el año 1943 por el general Franco", José Carlos Clemente, Seis estudios sobre el carlismo, Madrid 1999, ISBN 9788483741528, p. 24. Some authors advance an even more complex theory, namely that Carlos Pio was fleeing the Allied advance in Italy and “was invited to live in Barcelona”, Jeremy MacClancy, The Decline of Carlism, Reno 2000, ISBN 0874173442, p. 79. In March 1943, when Carlos Pio left Italy for Spain, the Allies were closing on the Axis troops in Tunisia; the Allied invasion of Sicily commenced in July 1943 and invasion of mainland Italy in September 1943
- he settled with his wife and a teo-year-old daughter; the second one was yet to be born in 1945
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 58
- the senile veteran died in unclear circumstances during the Civil War. The Carlist press listed him among victims of the Republican terror, see El Avisador Numantino 15.11.39, available here
- key proponent of the Carloctavista case in El Pardo was Julio Muñoz Aguilar, Jefe de Casa Civil del Caudilo, Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 184
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 70–71
- Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 120
- the manifesto was issued from Viareggio, as in the spring and early summer of 1943 Carlos Pio was shuttling between Barcelona, Andorra and Italy
- full text in Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 184–87
- the only paragraph which resembled an outline of political vision was when Don Carlos pledged loyalty to "principios y el programa de gobierno de mis augustos antecesores, los reyes de la Dinastía Carlista". When challenged by the Javieristas about his genuine intentions towards Franco, Don Carlos responded that "In the first place I must point out that in my manifesto of 29 June 1943 I swore to maintain the principles and the program of government of my illustrious ancestors, the Kings of the Carlist Dynasty. No one can proclaim, without accusing me of perjuring myself that I could accept other principles than those which my eminent ancestors defended with integrity. I shall be a traditional King or I shall not be King at all", quoted after Montells 1995, available here Archived 2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine
- in Spanish minusculed as carloctavistas; other orthographic variations were carlooctavistas, carlosoctavistas, carlo-octavistas and carlos-octavistas, all linguistic derivatives from Carlos Octavo (Charles the Eighth); another version was simply Octavistas (the Eighters)
- Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 187
- promoted to general in September 1942, see ABC 19.09.42, available here
- Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 121
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 71–72
- some claim that he was protected by the security forces, see MacClancy 2000, p. 80. Another view possible is that the security were monitoring him and making sure he did not go off limits. Some Carlists loyal to Don Javier refused to meet Don Carlos claiming that they would feel awkwardly accompanied by the Francoist police, which had earlier arrested their fellow Carlists, Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 185
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 72–73
- e.g. Lorenzo de Cura Lope in 1943–1957 served as president of Diputación de Alava, Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Díputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Alava (Segunda parte: 1938–1943), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 22 (2005), p. 167
- compare different issues of the Barcelona daily La Vanguardia Española, available here
- "Franco no se opuso a que Don Carlos VIII se le llamara y tratara públicamente como Rey, mientras argúia contra Don Javier y contra Don Juan de Borbón que ningún Jefe de Estado puede tolerar en su territorio que otra persona se titule también Jefe de Estado o Rey", Manuel Santa Cruz, Apuntes y documentos para la Historia del Tradicionalismo Español vol. XV, Seville 1979, p. 193
- e.g. some mention "su feroz oposición al falcondismo y al rodeznismo", Cantabrana Morras 2005, p. 146
- according to one account, "a supporter of Carlos VIII shot one of the crowd and was then stabbed. Requetés pulled out their firearms and began shooting. Three Carlists and nine armed policemen were wounded in the resulting fray. [...] Six years later to the day, falcondistas assaulted a small group of the enemy band and, once again, pistols were drawn", MacClancy 2000, p. 81. Slightly different account in Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 311. In most detailed scholarly account of the incident, the December Pamplona riots are presented mostly as Carlist confrontation with the Francoist police; a brawl between different Carlist factions is presented as secondary thread, Aurora Villanueva Martínez, Los incidentes del 3 de diciembre de 1945 en la Plaza del Castillo, [in:] Principe de Viana 58 (1997), pp. 629–650, especially pp. 635, 641 and 648. According to yet another account, in the early 1950s it was a favorite sport of the young Madrid Javieristas to hunt down the Carloctavistas with the sole purpose the beat them up, MacClancy 2000, p. 290
- in the late 1940s Don Carlos seemed like the most likely Carlist candidate to become a king. Unlike Don Juan and Don Javier, he resided in Spain; unlike Don Javier, he spoke native Spanish; unlike Don Juan, he was a genuine reactionary; apart from all the above, he was young, handsome, sporty and acted approprietly in a regal fashion, MacClancy 2000, p. 80
- see e.g. "pobre rey marioneta! pobre austriaco al servicio de la Falange que se ríen a sus barbas!", quoted after Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 128. Indeed during social unrest which broke out in Barcelona and Vascongadas the Javierista Carlists remained neutral, quietly watching both sides; Carlos Pio immediately declared his support for Franco, MacClancy 2000, p. 80, while the Octavistas put themselves at disposal of the governor, Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 335
- Santa Cruz 1979 vol. 4, p. 141
- "daban muestra de un dinamismo enorme", Mercedes Vázquez de Prada Tiffe, El papel del carlismo navarro en el inicio de la fragmentación definitiva de la comunión tradicionalista (1957–1960), [in:] Príncipe de Viana 72 (2011), p. 396
- MacClancy 2000, p. 290; they "found their numbers swelling", Blinkhorn 2008, p. 301
- Navarrese AET was entirely taken over by carloctavistas, Alcalá 2012, p. 319
- e.g. for Catalonia see Vallverdú Martí 2014; some authors mention also Alava as where the Octavista movement flourished, Cantabrana Morras 2005, p. 145
- Boletín Carlista, Lealtad Gallega, La Verdad, ¡Firmes!, Requetés de Catalunya, Catalunya Carlista and especially ¡Volvere!, Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 68, Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 121, MacClancy 2000, p. 80
- Clemente 1999, p. 24, Canal 2000, p. 353, José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, Reaccionarios y golpistas: la extrema derecha en España : del tardofranquismo a la consolidación de la democracia, 1967–1982, Madrid 1994, ISBN 9788400074425, p. 111
- Canal 2000, p. 353, Rodríguez Jiménez 1994, p. 111
- Cantabrana Morras 2005, p. 158
- the provinvial carloctavista jefe in Navarra was initially Emilio Dean Berro, see Alcalá 2012, pp. 249–50, to be later replaced by Antonio Lizarza, Alcalá 2012, pp. 273–74, 311
- e.g. Ramón Gassió Bosch in Catalonia or Emilio Deán Berro in Navarre, Clemente 1999, p. 24
- already in 1945 Franco declared at cabinet sittings that “monarchical form of government” would be adopted, with Consejo del Reino and accompanying infrastructure. In December 1946, just after anti-Francoist UNO resolution had been adopted, Carrero Blanco produced a memorandum suggesting installment of a monarchy with an impotent, decorative monarch; this was soon scaled down by Franco to a purely theoretical monarchy, so that he could “camouflage his regime with the trappings of acceptability", Preston 2011, pp. 529, 564–66
- Payne 2011, pp. 373–74
- MacClancy 2000, p. 85
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 75–76
- see e.g. Don Carlos voting in Barcelona Plaza de Soler, Colegio Electoral n. 11, NO-DO #136A footage (09:47 to 09.54); note his hand having been kissed by Jose Maria Junyent Quintana, son of the once Carlist Catalan leader Miguel Junyent Rovira), available here
- "Franco acted as if he was prepared to turn his back on the direct line of the Bourbon dynasty and seek an eventual successor elsewhere", Payne 2011, p. 328; “he would produce a law which turned Spain into a kingdom but that would not necessarily mean bringing back the Bourbons”, Preston 2011, p. 534
- Truman remained personally hostile to Franco and the Gallup 1948 poll reported that while 30 percent of those sampled shared the hostility, further 25 percent opposed admitting Spain to the United Nations, Payne 2011, p. 383
- e.g. the Soviet-inspired 1947 motion in the United Nations, authorising the Security Council to take unspecified steps against Spain, was blocked by the United States, Payne 2011, p. 381; in 1948 high American military officials for the first time visited Spain, Payne 2011, p. 382
- Payne 2011, p. 328
- Payne 2011, p. 379
- the agreement between Franco and Don Juan is considered a milestone in Carloctavista history, which marked its division into the ascending and descending phases, see Canal 2000, p. 353
- article 9 of the Law on Succession specified that a future king must be at least 30 years old; Juan Carlos was born in 1938
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 59–60
- at that time Reno was dubbed "divorce capital of the world", see entry on "Reno divorce ranch" on divorceseekers service, available here
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 80
- e.g. they held three annual sessions of Congreso Social, Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 89
- detailed discussion of the work in Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 91–98
- "nuestra política profesa un concepto rectamente democrático derivado del divino principio de a fraternidad verdadera", Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 96
- Alcalá 2012, p. 330
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 82
- Santa Cruz 1979, vol. 4, p. 173; the work was originally a PhD thesis, see Fondo Francisco Javier de Lizarza Inda, available here
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 63–67
- which does not prevent some scholars from claiming that Carlos Pio was in "excellents relacions amb el general", Vallverdú Martí 2014. p. 122
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 86–88, 243, some claim the meeting took place in 1951, Josep Carles Clemente Muñoz, Raros, heterodoxos, disidentes y viñetas del Carlismo, Madrid 1995, ISBN 9788424507077, p. 118
- in 1961 Franco refused a Toisón de Oro honour from Don Juan; there are speculations that Franco considered Toisón a state decoration while he viewed the San Carlos Borromeo order a dynastical one, Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 87. In 1952 Franco also formally acknowledged some appointments made by Don Carlos, namely his nomination of Vicente de Cadenas as Cronista de Armas, Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 103–104. However, unlike in case of nobility titles granted by earlier Carlist claimants, Franco has never recognized Carloctavista nobility titles, namely 2 marquesados, 10 condados and 1 vizcondado, all created in 1944–1951, Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 101–103
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 89–90, 119–121
- usually attributed either to Franco or the mainstream Carlists or the Alfonists. Also today some scholars do not rule out the assassination theory, see Julián Moreno Escribano, ¿Quién será el Rey? Los pretendientes al Trono de España, Madrid 1969, p. 34, Montells y Galán 1995, p. 60
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 122–123
- they were staged separately in Oviedo, Barcelona and Madrid, for footage see here
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 124–130
- between 1943 and his death there was only one case of ABC mentioning Carlos Pio, see ABC 28.03.51, available here
- see ABC 26.12.53, available here and the following page
- when discussing Navarre, one author notes that Carloctaivstas "prácticamente habían desaparecido", Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 433
- Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 123, Vázquez de Prada Tiffe 2011, p. 397, Alcalá 2012, p. 370; some authors claim that most Carloctavistas joined the Javieristas, Ramón María Rodon Guinjoan, Invierno, primavera y otoño del carlismo (1939–1976) [PhD thesis Universitat Abat Oliba CEU], Barcelona 2015, p. 104
- some claim that literally none, Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 165; different account, claiming that there were many former Carloctavistas present at Estoril in 1957, in Oyarzun 1965, p. 56, similar opinion in Alcalá 2012, p. 386. The one who can be identified by name is José María Comín Sagues
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 140–41
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 142
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 143
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 143–44; he later got disillusioned and concluded that Carlos VIII was "sold out" to Falange, Clemente 1995, p. 117
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 144
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 145
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 147
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 147–48
- Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 172; one author claims that even after 1956, Cora was supporting Don Antonio, see Montells 1995, available here Archived May 9, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
- addressing Don Javier in 1958 with a letter demanding adhesion to his own claim, Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 150
- he challenged Don Carlos Hugo, son of Don Javier, for allegedly unlawful usage of the duque de Madrid title, and demanded formal recognition of his duque do Molina title, both adopted by Carlist claimants in the early 19th century, Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 158, Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 124
- according to one reading he considered his royal claim as a heavy cross to bear and was happy to declare the struggle over once both his sons concluded morganatic marriages, rendering the line incapable of transmitting the heritage rights further on, Montells 1995, available here Archived May 9, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
- it would have been based on Carloctavistas and Javieristas agreeing a new Consejo Nacional of the party, which in turn would have appointed regional leaders. The deal did not work materialize, it is not clear whether Valiente rejected it or whether Lizarza abandoned his own proposal, Mercedes Vázquez de Prada, El final de una ilusión. Auge y declive del tradicionalismo carlista (1957-1967), Madrid 2016, ISBN 9788416558407, p. 133
- the adhesion menifesto, dated March 10, 1962, was signed by José Bru Jardí and Ramón Gassió Bosch for Catalonia, Lorenzo del Cura Lope for Alava, F. Suarez de Kelly for Asturias, Rafael Luis Gómez Carrasco for New Castile, Diego Hernández Illán for Murcia, Luis Olavarría Alayo for Biscay, Carmelo Paulo y Bondía for Valencia and Fermán Echeverría for the central Madrid Secretariat, Vázquez de Prada 2016, pp. 133-134. The author claims that the adhesion "terminaría definitivamente de las divisiones que debilitaban a la Comunión Tradicionalista"
- one author claims that Juntas de Defensa del Carlismo, mushrooming in Spain in the early 1960s as reaction to progressist bid to control Carlism, were formed by Sivattistas and the remaining Carloctavistas, MacClancy 2000, p. 98
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 160
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 161, Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 124; MacClancy 2000, p. 152 notes "two taxiloads of bellicose traditionalists, most of them in their late sixties"; when insulted by the Javieristas, one of them pulled out a gun; at this point Guardia Civil intervened and shuffled the Carloctavistas off the scene
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 148
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 161–62
- Clemente 1995, p. 24, Fondo Francisco Javier de Lizarza Inda, available here
- see e.g. carloctavismo service, available here
- Rodon Guinjoan 2015, p. 204; when interviewed in the United States by Lizarza Inda, the young Don Domingo asked why the Carlists do not back Juan Carlos, who "parecía buen chico", Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 154
- see Proclamación de Don Domingo de Habsburgo-Borbón y Hohenzollern, Rey legitimo de España, [in:] carloctavismo service, available here Archived 2014-05-23 at the Wayback Machine
- see a sub-chapter titled Carlos VIII, que inventaron los franquistas in Clemente 1995, pp. 115–118
- see Luis Suárez-Fernández, Francisco Franco y su tiempo, Madrid 1984, ISBN 9788485993031, vol. IV, pp. 63–64
- e.g. Josep Carles Clemente, Fermín Pérez-Nievas Borderas, María Teresa de Borbón-Parma, Joaquín Cubero Sanchez
- see a section titled Gallery of traitors, replicated in a number of books by Josep Carles Clemente, e.g. his Breve historia de las guerras carlistas, Madrid 2011, ISBN 9788499671697
- Clemente 2011, pp. 183–84, Fermín Pérez-Nievas Borderas, Contra viento y marea. Historia de la evolución ideological del carlismo a través de dos siglos de lucha, Estella 1999, ISBN 8460589323, p. 152
- e.g. quoting Dionisio Ridruejo, who maintained that "carloctavismo fue inventado y auspiciado desde la sombra, en las reuniones de „La Ballena Alegre” que altos dirigentes falangistas celebraban", Josep Carles Clemente, Historia del Carlismo contemporaneo 1935–1972, Barcelona 1977, ISBN 9788425307591. p. 184
- Clemente 1999, p. 24, Clemente 2011, p. 247: "operación franquista de atomizar las candidaturas monárquicas"
- Cantabrana Morras 2005, p. 159, "Carlos VIII, auspiciado por Franco y su Régimen", Josep Carles Clemente, Franco. Anatomia de genocida, Madrid 2014, pagination not available see here, Clemente 1977, p. 35, Clemente 1995, pp. 115–118, his also El Carlismo: historia de una disidencia social (1833–1976), Madrid 1990, ISBN��9788434410923, p. 128, Historia general del carlismo, Madrid 1992, ISBN 9788460446217, p. 378, El carlismo en la España de Franco, Madrid 1994, ISBN 8424506707, p. 25. Some authors claim that in few regions (in this case Alava), Carloctavismo and Falangismo merged into one and the same thing, as Octavistas "„cayeron en manos de Falange, produciéndose su integfración en el falangismo ya a partir de 1941", Cantabrana Morras 2006, p. 146
- "Carlos VIII, auspiciado por Falange", Josep Carles Clemente, Los días fugaces. El Carlismo. De las guerras civiles a la transición democratica, Cuenca 2013, ISBN 9788495414243, p. 54, "todo parecía indicar que era la Falange quien se encontraba detrás de la financiación de este pretendiente carlista", Pérez-Nievas Borderas 1999, p. 153
- "cierto, yo inventé a Carlos VIII", José Luis de Arrese, Una etapa constituyente, Barcelona 1982, ISBN 9788432036347 p. 154
- mostly Dionisio Ridruejo, Clemente 1995, p. 117
- Clemente 1995, p. 117
- María Teresa Borbón-Parma, Josep Carles Clemente, Joaquín Cubero Sanchez, Don Javier, una vida al servicio de la libertad, Barcelona 1997, ISBN 9788401530180, pp. 191–198
- "los octavistas se sentían realmente carlistas, hubo entre ellos quienes rechazaron la unificación con Falange – por ejemplo Del Burgo o Antonio Lizarza - y conservaron la simbología carlista", Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 185
- e.g. José María García Escudero, La política, [in:] Luis Suárez Fernández, Manuel Espadas Burgos (eds.), Historia general de España y América, vol. 2.19, Madrid 1987, ISBN 9788432123597, pp. 5–177, Canal 2000, p. 352, Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 121
- Blinkhorn 2008, p. 186, Payne 2011, p. 327
- e.g. Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 121 adds "probably" ("es molt probable que el sosteniment de l’arxiduc i la gran quantitat de propaganda que l’envoltava eren financats per les arques oficials"), Blinkhorn 2008, p. 186 notes that charges of receiving alien subsidies were customarily traded between Carlist factions (indeed Manuel Fal claimed that Franco supplied the carloctavistas with "medida necesaria", quoted after Caspistegui Gorasurreta 1997, p. 15), Canal 2000, p. 352 adds "initially" ("la operación fue estimulada e inicialmente financiada desde el proprio régimen")
- MacClancy 2000, p. 80: "Carlos VIII’ Catholic-Monarchist Comunión was promptly provided with money, mayorships of villages, and posts within the Movimiento"; Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 185: "sus actividades fueran apoyadas y hasta financiadas por gobernadores provinciales y el Movimiento"
- "no cabe duda de que [Don Francisco José] había recibido alientos económicos para presentar en los tribunales esta demanda [against Don Carlos Hugo]", Javier Lavardin [José Antonio Parilla], Historia del ultimo pretendiente a la corona de España, Paris 1976, p. 239
- see Caspistegui Gorasurreta 1997, pp. 13–16
- "por un lado, de medidas gubernativas - instrucciones y órdenes a los transportistas - y medidas policiales - control de carreteras los días previos; y por otro, de actividades de contrapropaganda e intoxicación política", Aurora Villanueva Martínez, Organizacion, actividad y bases del carlismo navarro durante el primer franquismo [in:] Geronimo de Uztariz 19 (2003), p. 109
- Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 119
- Vallverdú Martí 2014, p. 122
- "el carlismo auténtico, defensor del Duque de Madrid, no ha recibido nunca subvención alguna, ni ayuda de ninguna clase del Estado ni de Falange. De esto respondo solemnemente. Sería incompatible con el honor, la libertad y la independencia políticas de la Comunión", quoted after Caspistegui Gorasurreta 1997, p. 14
- writings of Cesar Alcalá (born 1965) demonstrate clear Carlist leaning, though the author focuses rather on offshoot branches of the movement, with two of his books dedicated to Carloctavista and Sivattista secessionists. Francisco Manuel de las Heras y Borrero (1951–2004) as historian focused on aristocratic genealogy and was member of a number of Catholic groupings, see here; the third author, José Maria de Montells y Galán (born 1949), demonstrates a partisan carlocativsta perspective
- see e.g. the sub-chapter Un rey de la clase media: una vida sencilla, Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 136–139; other sympathetic accounts in Vila-San-Juan 1993, p. 228, Montells 1995, pp. 59–60
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 65–67
- Heras y Borrero 2004, p. 165
- view shared also bo scholars hardly sympathetic to Carloctavismo, e.g. Cantabrana Morras 2005, p. 146; also Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 301–02, who notes that the claim of Don Carlos "reflected on the other hand a desire for a quite distinct [from collaborative Rodeznista faction] Carlist movement capable of independent action in relation to the regime"
- Heras y Borrero 2004, pp. 106–107
- César Alcalá, Cruzadistas y carloctavistas: historia de una conspiración, Barcelona 2012, ISBN 9788493884253
- Iñigo Bolinaga Irasuegui, El carloctavismo, [in:] Historia 16/370 (2007), pp. 78–87
- Francisco de las Heras y Borrero, El archiduque Carlos de Habsburgo-Lorena y de Borbón, [in:] Historia y Vida 180 (1983), pp. 26–35
- Francisco de las Heras y Borrero, Un pretendiente desconocido. Carlos de Habsburgo. El otro candidato de Franco, Madrid 2004, ISBN 8497725565
- Melchor Ferrer, Historia del tradicionalismo español vol XXX, Sevilla 1979
- José Maria de Montells y Galán, La Otra Dinastia, 1833–1975, Madrid 1995, ISBN 8492001658
- Manuel de Santa Cruz [Alberto Ruiz de Galarreta], Apuntes y documentos para la historia del tradicionalismo español, vols. 3-4, Sevilla 1979
- Joan Maria Thomàs, Carlisme Barceloní als anys quarenta: „Sivattistes”, „Unificats”, „Octavistes”, [in:] L’Avenc 212 (1992), pp. 12–17
- Román Oyarzun, Pretendientes al trono de España, Barcelona 1965
- Mercedes Vázquez de Prada, La vuelta del octavismo a la Comunión Tradicionalista, [in:] Aportes 77 (2011), pp. 85–96
- Don Carlos voting in 1947 referendum, NO-DO #136A footage in present-day compilation (09:47 to 09.54); note his hand having been kissed by Jose Maria Junyent Quintana
- Don Carlos' burial footage
- Don Carlos' burial report in La Vanguardia Española
- obituary in ABC
- El Cruzado Español in Hemeroteca Digital
- Carloctavismo by Montells y Galan
- Carloctavista site advancing Domingo I claim
- full-blown Carloctavista genealogical tree
- on YouTube